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THE PUBLIC CHOICE OF CHOICE OF
LAW IN SOFTWARE TRANSACTIONS:
JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION AND
THE DIM PROSPECTS FOR UNIFORMITY
Ted Janger
Going last in a program like this is both a blessing and a
curse. On the one hand, you get to sum up, draw conclusions,
and generally have the last word. On the other hand, to the
extent that you had prepared remarks or observations to make,
you might as well start fresh. There are only so many original
things to say. By the end of the day most of them have been
said. In the hope of avoiding this problem, I propose to take
what we have learned today about the law of international
software transactions and, in this panel about the law of
"choice of law," apply it to a slightly different question.
Most of our conversation has focused on substantive law,
on how the law of international software transactions should
relate to the law of sale of goods and the law of intellectual
property licenses. In the background has been a turf battle
between experts on two* substantive areas of law, contract and
copyright. Not surprisingly, proponents of contract believe that
principles of consent and exchange should trump the copyright
policies1 that establish the boundaries of intellectual property
rights. Again, not surprisingly, proponents of copyright argue
for the primacy of intellectual property law and point out that
some aspects of IP law rise to the level of social policy and may
not be waived.2 I intend to shift the focus to political institu-
t Copyright © 2000 Ted Janger.
* Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School; JD 1987 University of Chicago;
BA 1983 Yale College. The author would like to thank the participants in the
Brooklyn Law School symposium on software licensing for their thoughtful presen-
tations, Spencer Waller for comments on an earlier draft, and Tally Wiener for
exceptional research assistance.
1. See Raymond T. Nimmer, International Information Transactions: An Essay
on Law in an Information Society, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 5, 13-14 (2000).
2. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, UCITA in the International Marketplace: Are
we about to Export Bad Innovation Policy?, 26 BROOK. J. INTL L. 49, 52-53 (2000);
Samuel K. Murumba, The Emerging Law of the Digital Domain and the Con-
tract/IP Interface: An Antipodean Perspective, 26 BROOK. J. INTL L. 91, 106-07
(2000).
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tions, and to replace the question "what is the correct rule?"
with the question "who should make the rules?" Which institu-
tions should we choose to generate the substantive law of in-
ternational transactions in computer information? Since this is
a panel on "choice of law" I will ask the question in a more
focused way, "which institution should generate the choice of
law rules for international software transactions?"
I. LOCATING THE CHOICE OF CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE
Kathy Patchel's explication of choice-of-law principles and
how they apply in the case of UCITA helps to crystallize both
the choice-of-law question and the choice-of-institutions ques-
tion.' A choice-of-law rule is an institutional choice among the
substantive law of sovereign countries. The sovereign whose
interest is most strongly implicated by the transaction gets to
govern (subject, in most cases, to the parties' choice of govern-
ing law). In this way, choice-of-law-principles allow courts and
parties to determine which menus of substantive law terms
will govern the transaction. But this is only part of the ques-
tion. Substantive law, and indeed choice-of-law rules, for multi-
jurisdictional transactions can be generated in a number of
ways:
* Non-uniform state law (within the United States) or
national law (for international transactions);
" Uniform state law (d la the UCC4) or national law (d la
3. See Kathleen Patchel, Choice of Law and Software Licenses: A Framework
for Discussion, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 117 (2000).
4. The Uniform Commercial Code is a joint product of the American Law In-
stitute and the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Law. "The
American Law Institute was formed in 1923 for the purpose of preparing Restate-
ments of the common law," DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BASIC UNIFORI COMMERCIAL
CODE TEACHING MATERIAL 1 (3d ed. 1988) (citing H. GOODRICH & P. WOLKIN, THE
STORY OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (1961)), but joined the UCC project in
1945. William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1967). The National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is a quasi governmental body,
organized in 1892 "to promote uniformity in law . .. through voluntary state ac-
tion." EPSTEIN, supra, at 1. 'The Commissioners are appointed by state officials,
usually the governor. The Commissioners meet once a year; each state votes as a
unit on each proposal. The work of the Conference is financed primarily by the
proportional assessment paid by each state." Id. See also Allison Dunham, A Histo-
ry of the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, 30 LAW &
[Vol. XXV: 1188
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UNIDROIT5 or UNCITRAL6 );
0 Supra-state or supra-national law (i.e., in the United
States, federal law, and in the European Union, EU Di-
rective7); or,
CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (1965).
5. The International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law-UNIDROIT-was established in 1926 as an arm of the League of Nations
and then re-established in 1940 as an independent intergovernmental organization.
See International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, done at Rome, Mar.
15, 1940, 15 U.S.T. 2494, T.I.A.S. No. 5743. Its purpose is to "examine ways of
harmonizing and co-ordinating the private law of States and groups of States, and
to prepare gradually for the adoption by the various States of uniform
legislationship in the field of private law." Id art. 1. UNIDROIT is comprised of
58 Member States including the United States (a member since 1964). See 22
U.S.C. § 269(g) (1998). UNIDROIT is financed by the annual contributions of its
members and the Italian Government. See International Institute for the Unifica-
tion of Private Law (Unidroit) (visited Apr. 6, 2000) <http:/www.unidroit.org/eng-
lish/presentation/pres.htm> (on file with author). Based in Rome, UNIDROIT is a
three-tiered organization with a Secretariat, a Governing Council and a General
Assembly. See id. The General Assembly is the ultimate decision-making body of
the organization, comprised of one representative from each Member State (except
from the Italian government) with voting power over its annual budget, Work
Programme and the election of the Governing Council. See id. UNIDROIT has
either led or aided the creation of several international conventions, including:
International Convention on the Travel Contract; United Nations Convention on
the Contracts for the International Sale of Goods; and, UNIDROIT Convention on
Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects. See id.
6. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law was estab-
lished in 1966 by the Goneral Assembly to promote harmonization in the area of
international trade law. See G.A. Res. 2205, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
at 99, U.N. Doe. A16316 (1967). The Commission is composed of 36 Member
States, representing the world's various geographical regions, elected by the Gener-
al Assembly for six-year terms. See United National Commission on International
Trade Law (visited Apr. 6, 2000) <http://www.uncitral.org/eng-
lish/commiss/index.htm> (on file with author). Major works of UNCITRAL include:
United Nations Convention on the International Sales of Goods; United Nations
Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea; Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards; Model law on Cross-Border Insolvency;
and, Model Law on Electronic Commerce. See id.
7. A Directive issued by the European Council or Commission "shall be bind-
ing, as to the result to be achieved upon each Member State to which it is ad-
dressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and meth-
od." TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 249 (ex
art. 189), O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC
TREATY], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992,
O.J. (C 224) (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU], and
amended by Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1. A Directive, which be-
comes effective when a Member State is notified, requires the Member State "to
take the legislative and/or administrative action needed to implement the
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International law, through bilateral or multilateral trea-
ty or potentially through customary international law.
Broadly speaking, these legislative approaches can be
characterized as bottom-up (non-uniform state or national law),
voluntary top-down (uniform or model law), and mandatory
top-down (U.S. federal law or EU Directive). Each has relative
benefits and disadvantages.
Bottom-up. In a decentralized, non-uniform regime, each
jurisdiction (i.e., nation or state) makes its own law without
consideration of the law of other jurisdictions. Such non-uni-
form lawmaking has the benefit of adaptation to local condi-
tions, and more direct accountability. It has the disadvantage
that, as Madison pointed out in Federalist 10,8 a faction may
capture the local government and oppress a minority. In addi-
tion, non-uniform law may be subject to jurisdictional
competition.' Jurisdictional competition occurs when states
and nations use local law to compete for business and invest-
ment. An attractive rule may cause capital to flow into the
relevant state. The effect of such competition is ambiguous.
Usually, the jurisdiction with the more efficient rule will at-
tract more business. This is often referred to as a "race to the
top." However, the possibility of inter and intra-jurisdictional
directive's purposes." GEORGE A. BERMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EURO-
PEAN COMiMUNITY LAW 75 (1993). In theory, Directives do not have to be detailed,
but are often specifically drafted as to how they are to be implemented. See id.
However, although Directives may be "binding" on a Member State, it may not be
directly applicable. See id.
8. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
9. Some commentators argue that interstate competition produces a "race to
the bottom," see, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 665-66 (1974); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Federalism
and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1443-44 (1992); Others argue that it produces a "race to
the top." See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare:
Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 564-71 (1984); Daniel R. Fischel,
The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in
Delaware's Corporate Law, 76 NW U.L. REV. 913, 919 (1982). Roberta Romano
argues that it is a race for predictability and stability. Roberta Romano, Law as
Product: Some Pieces of the Corporate Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 273-78
(1985). She observed that many jurisdictions have enacted liberal corporate law,
but that Delaware remains the incorporation champ. This is because it has an
experienced corporate bar, a small bench which is familiar with corporate law
issues, and a corporate code which can only be amended by a two-thirds vote of
both houses of the state legislature. See id.
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externalities undercut this prediction. Most importantly, there
is the possibility of interstate externality. This occurs when
citizens of one jurisdiction can favor local businesses at the
expense of citizens of other jurisdictions. Jurisdictional compe-
tition is more likely to result in a so-called "race to the bot-
tom.
, ,1 o
Top-down (voluntary). Centralized but voluntary lawmak-
ing has some powerful advantages as well. A centralized draft-
ing process brings expertise and drafting talent to bear on the
legislative project," and makes that expertise available to
multiple jurisdictions. Also, the desire for uniform enactment
may reduce the power of local faction. Since local enactment of
the uniform law is voluntary, issues that might endanger uni-
versal enactment must be avoided by the legislative drafters.
Provisions which favor a faction in one state may disadvantage
the citizens of another state. Therefore, to be uniformly enact-
ed, the statute must be a product of consensus. 2 This need
for consensus has the natural tendency to narrow the scope of
uniform laws to topics where consensus can be reached. This
can be both an advantage (where agreement can be reached)
and a disadvantage (if regulation is necessary and no consen-
sus is possible). The need for consensus creates two powerful
dynamics. First, if consensus can be achieved only by anticipat-
ing the result of capture, the uniform lawmaking process may
10. For a more comprehensive discussion, see Edward J. Janger, Predicting
When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the
Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569 (1998). In addition to interstate externality, there is
the possibility of intra-firm externality. For example, a state can adopt a rule that
favors a corporate constituency that controls the decision where to incorporate or
where to do business, while imposing costs on a disenfranchised constituency with-
in the firm (i.e., the jurisdiction can favor managers at the expense of sharehold-
ers). Finally, there is the possibility of temporal externality. This occurs when a
legislature can adopt a rule that appears efficient at the time, but will impose
costs on citizens after the legislator has left office. For example, a legislator or
legislative coalition can encourage a chemical plant to locate in the jurisdiction.
This will have short term benefits for the jurisdiction and the legislature. Howev-
er, this may cause long term harm to the environment or citizens which will not
manifest until after the relevant legislator has left office.
11. See James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2096, 2096
(1991).
12. See Janger, supra note 10, at 580, 583; Ted Janger, The Locus of Law-
making: Uniform State Law, Federal Law, and Bankruptcy Reform, 74 AM. BANKR.
L.J. (forthcoming Winter 2000).
2000]
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unavoidably facilitate capture."3 Second, uniform law drafters
may be forced to anticipate the effect of jurisdictional competi-
tion. Here, the effect is ambiguous. Where jurisdictional com-
petition will lead to a race to the top, anticipation of jurisdic-
tional competition will be beneficial (though perhaps not quite
as beneficial as actual competition), and where jurisdictional
competition will lead to a race to the bottom, the effect will be
deleterious.'4
Top-Down Mandatory. Centralized mandatory rulemaking
eliminates both the costs and benefits of anticipated jurisdic-
tional competition, 5 and can (in some cases) benefit from the
advantages of expertise and drafting skill. However, the feder-
al government in the United States and the European Union
are also subject to capture, and they may provide the conve-
nience of "one-stop interest group shopping."6 Note, in the
United States this is compounded by the possibility of govern-
ment by minimum winning coalition 7 and the ability to
horsetrade.5 In Europe, given the relative youth of the EU
mechanisms and the focus that many decisions are subject to
unanimity or supermajority requirements in the Council of
Ministers, the need for consensus may still provide a salutary
discipline on special interest coalition building, but I leave that
to the commentators on EU law. What does this Cook's tour of
institutional strategies tell us about the preferred locus of
13. See Janger, supra note 10, at 578-80.
14. See id.
15. As I have noted elsewhere, federal law is self-executing. Therefore juris-
dictional competition is not a problem. See Janger, supra note 12.
16. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of
Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988); Jona-
than R. Macy, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpre-
tation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 223 (1986); Edward J. Janger,
The FDIC's Fraudulent Conveyance Power Under the Crime Control Act of 1990:
Bank Insolvency Law and the Politics of the Iron Triangle, 28 CONN. L. REV. 67
(1995).
17. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS 255 (1962);
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT. LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 211, 242-44 (1962).
18. See Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 385 (1992). Economists are divided over whether "vote trad-
ing" is likely to be efficient. See William H. Riker & Steven J. Brains, The Para-
dox of Vote Trading, 67 AM. POL. SC. REV. 1235, 1236 (1973) (pork creates nega-
tive externalities for voters who don't benefit from the pork, but rational legisla-
tom will nonetheless seek to procure pork for their own districts); BUCHANAN &
TULLOCK, supra note 17, at 145 (logrolling is likely welfare enhancing).
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JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION
lawmaking with regard to international software transactions?
Should we use bottom-up, voluntary top-down, or mandatory
top-down? In particular, is uniform law-making of the UCITA
type a viable option?
II. IDENTIFYING THE TRANSACTIONS
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to briefly
identify and describe the transactions at issue. The first trans-
action type is the mass market transaction in information in
tangible form. For example, Professor Dessemontet goes to a
store in Lausanne, Switzerland and buys a compact disk con-
taining RealPlayer for his son, along with a license, the terms
of which are printed in very small letters on the outside of the
box. Professor Dessemontet pays in cash, and loads the pro-
gram onto his home computer.
The second type of transaction is a mass market transac-
tion in information, where the information is downloaded elec-
tronically through the use of the World Wide Web or other
communications device. For example, Professor Dessemontet
uses his home computer, located in Lausanne, Switzerland, to
download RealPlayer for his son, pays with his credit card,
"agrees" on-line to the terms of a "click wrap" license, and
installs the program onto that computer. While Professor
Dessemontet's computer is in Lausanne, Real Networks' server
is located in Seattle, Washington.
The third type of transaction is a customized transaction
between commercial parties. Here an example might be a li-
cense contract entered into by a major bank for a complex,
custom designed, payroll management system with a Canadian
software designer.
III. INTERSTATE EXTERNALITY, JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION
AND CHOICE OF LAW
As noted above, a common concern for both bottom-up and
top-down (voluntary) lawmaking is that any rule which creates
an opportunity for a jurisdiction to capitalize on an interstate
externality may lead to a race to the bottom, or an anticipated
race to the bottom. Thus, a threshold question for choosing the
appropriate locus of lawmaking for regulation of these transac-
tions is, "do these transactions create an opportunity for inter-
state externality?" The answer appears to be yes, at least with
20001 193
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regard to mass market transactions. Since a licensor of mass
market software can do business all over the world, a state
which adopts licensor friendly rules can set the rules for the
world, to the extent choice-of-law rules allow this to happen. If
this is the case, what does this tell us about the appropriate
institution for generating choice-of-law rules?
With regard to multi-jurisdictional software transactions,
in the absence of an enforceable choice-of-law clause, there are
two possible choice-of-law rules. The law of the licensor can
control or the law of the licensee can control. This matters
because in many cases, the first question to be decided will be
whether a choice-of-law clause in a click-wrap license should
be viewed as part of the contract. As Professor Patchel points
out, principles of interest analysis would strongly suggest that,
at least with regard to mass market transactions, a software li-
cense is similar to a sale of goods, and the most significant
interest lies in the jurisdiction of the licensee. As Professor
Dessemontet has pointed out, European jurisdictions follow
that approach. 9 In the United States, by contrast, the law is
in disarray,0 and UCITA adopts the law of the licensor ap-
19. See Frangois Dessemontet, The European Approach to E-Commerce and
Licensing, 26 BROOK. J. INTL L. 59, 72-73 (2000).
20. In at least two cases, the courts have applied the law of the licensee's
jurisdiction to the transaction. But these cases provide little basis for predicting
how courts will rule in other cases. See McConnell & Sons, Inc. v. Target Data
Systems, Inc., 84 F. Supp.2d 961 (N.D. Ind. 1999); NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech.
Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536 (N.D. Okla. 1997).
In the Target Data case, the court held that, where the contract was silent
as to choice of law, the licensee's law (also the law of the forum) governed the
contract dispute. However, the Target court's efforts to identify the "situs" of the
contract provide little guidance for modem mass market software transactions.
First the court found that, based on its research and that of defendant, there were
no "substantive differences" between the law of the licensor (Connecticut) and the
licensee (Indiana), and that, therefore, the "forum should apply forum law." Target
Data, 84 F. Supp.2d at 973. The court then explored Indiana's conflict-of-law rules,
and tried to identify the state with the most "intimate contact" with the transac-
tion. Id. at 973 n.15. The court held that Indiana law controlled because: (1) while
the contract was primarily negotiated in Connecticut, the contract was signed by
plaintiff in Indiana, and, "under Indiana law, a contract is deemed made in the
state where the last act necessary to make it a binding agreement occurs," id. at
973 (citation omitted); (2) "[tlhe contract was performed in Indiana (by either . . .
[plaintiffs] employees in Indiana, or by . . . [defendant's] employees via modem,"
id.; (3) the software which constituted the "subject matter of the contract" was
presumably located in both the licensor's and licensee's state, id.; and, (4) the
plaintiff resided in Indiana, and the defendant in Connecticut, see id.
In NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp. the contract between the parties
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proach with regard to software downloaded electronically.21
While such a rule appears to be inconsistent with "interest
analysis," there is a plausible argument that the interest in
facilitating commerce over the world wide web justifies the
rule. Which approach, however, is preferable from the perspec-
tive of encouraging uniformity in choice-of-law rules and dis-
couraging a race to the bottom with regard to the substantive
law of licensing?22
At first blush, the law of the licensor rule, coupled with
UCITA's routine enforcement of forum selection clauses23
would appear to exacerbate the possibility of interstate
externality, whether adopted as a non-uniform law, uniform
law, or as a top-down rule. Starting with the non-uniform,
bottom-up approach the analysis plays out as follows. If one
contained a choice-of-law clause, selecting Massachusetts law, and a clause contrac-
tually limiting the time within which to bring suit. The court engaged in tortured
reasoning to conclude that the law of Oklahoma (the licensee's jurisdiction) con-
trolled. To accomplish this, the court treated the contract as a sale of goods and
applied Article 2 of Oklahoma's UCC to conclude that the clause was enforceable.
958 F. Supp. at 1541-42.
21. Section 109(b)(1) of UCITA provides:
(b) In the absence of an enforceable choice-of-law term, the fol-
lowing rules apply:
(1) An access contract or a contract providing for elec-
tronic delivery of a copy is governed by the law of the
jurisdiction in which the licensor is located when the
agreement is made.
UCITA § 109 (emphasis added).
22. One further question is why there is such concern if the choice-of-law
provisions can be waived by contract? In this regard, the concern may be over-
stated with regard to customized negotiated transactions. However, where mass
market transactions are concerned, there is more reason for concern. Mass market
license transactions involve off the rack terms, with no opportunity to negotiate,
under conditions of imperfect information. One example is presented by the prob-
lem of private information. Personal information is the coin of the realm in the
new economy, but many software licensee may not realize the value of what
he/she is giving up in terms of private information or contract rights. Indeed, the
information may be gathered without asking (by depositing a "cookie"). Even if the
licensee knows the value of the information given, there are serious difficulties in
detecting breach. If a customer provides personal information subject to a privacy
policy, and the purchaser of that information breaches the agreement and sells the
information, the consumer is unlikely to find out. Finally, there is no opportunity
to negotiate the terms of a click wrap license, nor is such negotiation necessarily
desirable. It is unrealistic to expect consumers to read complex licenses. Even if
they could understand them, it may not be efficient for them to spend the time.
This is not to say that the default rules need to be mandatory, but they should,
perhaps be "sticky" in the manner of warranty terms under Article 2 of the UCC.
23. UCITA § 110.
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jurisdiction adopts a UCITA type rule, then licensors in that
jurisdiction get the benefit of local law, so long as suit is
brought there. This will put pressure on other jurisdictions to
adopt the same rule if they wish to attract licensors' business.
Licensors' assets are electronic and mobile which puts further
pressure on local legislators to adopt law that is substantively
friendly to licensors. At the same time jurisdictions that have
many licensees and few licensors, or a strong tradition of con-
sumer protection, will be unlikely to adopt the location of licen-
sor rule. Thus, in a bottom-up-world, the law of the licensor
rule creates a strong pressure to race to the bottom with re-
gard to substantive rules, and also leaves a strong possibility
of non-uniformity with regard to both substantive and choice-
of-law rules.
If a jurisdiction adopts the UCITA approach as a proposed
uniform law, in the top-down (voluntary) regime, the analysis
is largely the same. However, the inclusion of a law of the
licensor choice-of-law rule appears likely to endanger uniform
enactment. Jurisdictions which do not have a significant licen-
sor constituency, or which have a strong tradition of consumer
protection, are likely to resist the uniform rule in order to
insure their own domestic policy concerns.
Finally, the top-down mandatory approach remedies the
uniformity problem with regard to choice-of-law rules, but
creates a second problem. Central adoption of a law of the
licensor rule might create a strong pressure on jurisdictions to
use their substantive law of licensing to compete for licensors,
which in turn creates an incentive to race to the bottom with
regard to the substantive law of licensing.
Thus a law of the licensor rule is unlikely to become a
uniform choice-of-law rule under either a decentralized or
uniform law approach, and is likely to create an incentive
towards a substantive race to the bottom if it is adopted as a
mandatory rule of international law. One might ask, therefore,
whether a law of the licensee rule will work better from either
perspective. At first glance, the law of the licensee rule would
not appear to solve the problem. The same pressures that
would likely defeat uniform adoption of a UCITA type rule
would work in reverse with regard to a law of the licensee rule.
Even if the uniform or model law drafters were to choose a law
of the licensee rule, some jurisdictions would likely adopt a law
of the licensor rule independently. While this has not occurred
[Vol. XXVI: I
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in Europe, this may be because, as Professor Dessemontet has
pointed out, this mode of commerce is still new to the Europe-
an Union.
IV. CONCLUSION
However, there is a possible solution to the problem that
yields a uniform choice-of-law rule and minimizes inefficient
jurisdictional competition. It might be possible to adopt a "law
of the licensee" rule as a mandatory top-down rule. This would
render the choice-of-law rule uniform, but would leave individ-
ual jurisdictions free to experiment with their software licens-
ing regime. While states would be free to adopt licensor
friendly legal rules, the effect of those rules would be confined
to their borders. This would limit the incentive for software
licensors to go hunting for friendly jurisdictions, and would
preserve the ability of states to experiment as new patterns of
commerce develop. In short, it might be best to adopt a top-
down law of the licensee rule, in order to obtain the benefits of
a decentralized regime for the development of licensing law.
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